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In this paper I want to set forth and explain the 
linguisitc theory of the French psycho-analyst Jacques 
Lacan. More concretely, I want to show how Lacan's 
theory revolutionizes the traditional (metaphysical) 
understanding of metaphor and metonymy and what the 
role of language, of metaphor and metonymy, is in 
Lacan's psycho-analysis. 
Like so many structuralists and post-structura-
lists, like so many thinkers in France, Lacan goes back 
to the Swiss linguist of the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Ferdinand de Saussure. Lacan's linguistic 
theory originates in a reading of de Saussure's Cours 
de linguistique generale, a reading that at the same 
time radicalizes de Saussure's insights. If one reads 
de Saussure in a certain way, language becomes a game 
of differences. What follows is a reading of de 
Saussure as it is found in some of Lacan's texts (a 
reading, by the way, that someone like Jacques Derrida 
will at least partially subscribe to). 
A word, a linguistic sign establishes the union of 
a sound (an acoustic image) and a concept (a mental 
image). The relation between these two, between the 
signifier and the signified, is arbitrary. There is no 
reason whatsoever why the sound 'tree' O / t . ) would 
evoke the concept 'tree'. The signified 'tree' could 
be represented by any other signifying sound. To prove 
this, de Saussurc refers to the different languages: 
for example, the signified 'tree* has the English sig-
nifier ['A/l. 1 and the Dutch signifier Ifco.tn ). Both 
signifiers serve equally well to signify the concept 
•tree'. 
This arbitrariness in the relation between signi-
fier and signified causes the strange phenomenon that 
each element of language cannot be determined in isola-
tion from the others: one cannot derive the signified 
from the acoustic signifier, nor can one induce the 
signifier from the signified concept. The elements of 
a language can only be determined through the network 
of relations to which they belong. Like the pieces in 
a game of chess, the elements of language do not have a 
content or a meaning of their own; they only have a 
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meaning on the basis of their mutual relations, or in-
sofar as they possess a value in a system or structural 
network. 
The elements of language do not have a positive 
content of their own; they only have a value insofar as 
they differ from other elements. The value of elements 
can only be determined in a negative way, i.e., through 
the relation with other elements in the system. Each 
element is only what the other is not. This holds true 
for both signifier and signified. The signified 'car' 
gets determined through its difference from other sig-
nifieds like 'chariot', wagon', 'van', 'sleigh', etc. 
Similarly, the signifier 't' only signifies in the sign 
'cat' because it makes that sign differ from signs like 
'cap', 'cab', 'can', etc. 
The foregoing does away with a lot of the tradi-
tional concepts and insights. The signified is no 
longer an extra-textual, transcendental "idea" that, 
sufficient in itself, precedes every lingual constitu-
tion and waits for an expression by a signifier. It 
can only be determined in a negative way. It has 
become an effect of the signifying game of differences. 
The signifier can no longer be thought of as the vehi-
cle of a signifying element. It has become an instance 
that distinguishes signification and that does not have 
any signification in itself. It produces signification 
through its difference from other signifiers. A third 
consequence of the Lacanian way of reading de Saussure 
is the lack of a pre-established correspondence between 
the order of the signifier and the order of the 
signified. Language is a system of differences, in 
which the immediate link between signifier and signi-
fied has disappeared. 
With these insights we can try to understand the 
Lacanian algorithms for the linguistic sign. Lacan 
depicts the sign as follows: %£*(S)-£ '. Here the sig-
nifier S creates a meaning, but it can only do so 
thanks to its relation with other signifiers; it needs 
the complementation of other signifiers that can appear 
in the place kept open by 1, in order to (fully) sig-
nify s. Or to put it differently, the meaning 's' does 
not get signified by the signifier S; there is always a 
difference between S and s; s has been delayed; a 
detour via other signifiers is needed, and even then s 
will always withdraw and never become fully present. 
And there is more. If the signified is understood 
as an effect of the signifying chain, and if this ef-
fect can be delayed, the signified is ultimately non-
existent. There is no transcendental "idea" beyond the 
chain of signifiers that could bring the signifying 
chain to a halt. All signification is provisional; ul-
timately, the signified is itself of the order of the 
signifiers. 
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These linguistic insights Lacan combines with the 
psychoanalytic theory of the "Urverdrängung." The 
sign in which the difference between signifier and sig-
nified is never really overcome, mirrors the breach in 
reality brought about by language. The primal repres-
sion constitutes the unconscious in that it pushes back 
into the unconscious the original symbiotic union of 
child and mother. This imagined union of the child 
with its mother is forever delayed in the primal re-
pression that is caused by the child's access to lan-
guage and fully achieved by its passage through the 
oedipal triangle. In appropriating language'the child 
tries to master the mother's absence: this is the 
meaning Lacan gives to the "Fort-Da" episode in Freud's 
"Jenseits vom Lustprinzip." In uttering the phonemes 
0-A the child shows its awareness of the mother's suc-
cessive presence and absence. It also proves that it 
knows the mother as different from itself; in symbolis-
ing the mother's disappearance it discovers the mother 
as<-the desired object. This is the paradox of the 
whole situation: in an attempt to symbolise the 
mother's presence in words, the child loses the union 
with its mother for ever. From now on, it can only ap-
proach its mother through the mediation of language. 
An immediate union is irrecuperably lost. "Ainsi le 
Symbole se manifeste comme meurtre de la chose."1 
The child's access to language and the primal re-
pression as loss of the immediacy is completed in the 
oedipal constellation, through which the child takes on 
the phallus as a signifier. In the acceptance of the 
Hame-of-the-father, the child recognizes its desire. 
In recognizing its desire, the child also renounces it. 
Originally, the infant desires to be the phallus, i.e., 
desires to be the object of the mother's desire. But 
in subjecting itself to the Naiue-of-the-father, and the 
law it incarnates, the child assumes itself, i.e., its 
own lack—it names this lack and as such takes on the 
symbol that signifies it. In this way, the primal re-
pression is at the same time a repression of the para-
dise of immediacy and of the symbolic order forever in-
tervenes in the desired union. Consequently, the 
"Urverdrängung" is the fall of the first signifier 
(the phallus) and causes the unconscious to be struc-
tured like a language. Language is not at the free 
disposal of the subject; on the contrary, the subject 
can only be subject if he subjects himself to the laws 
of language. The subject is "serf du langage";2 it is 
not the subject who uses language as an "organon," but 
language speaks through him as persona. "Die Sprache 
spricht. Der Mensch spricht, insofern er der Sprache 
entspricht."1 This is why Lacan can claim that the un-
conscious laws that govern man are linguistic rules. 
The institution of the subject is determined "by the 
absolute play of combination and substitution in the 
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signifier, according to the two aspects that generate 
the signified, metonymy and metaphor.'"' 
Lacan formulates the metonymy as follows: 'f 
(S S' )SS£ S(-)s', 
"indiguant que c'est la connexion du signifiant 
au signifiant, qui permet 1'elision par quoi le 
signifiant installe le manque de l'etre dans la 
relation d'objet, en se servant de la valeur de 
renvoi de la signification pour l'investir du 
desir vivant ce manque qu'il supporte."' 
The metonymy is constituted in a horizontal, syntag-
matic expansion of signifiers: this expansion makes a 
movement from S to S'. In itself this movement is end-
less: ever new signifiers can be added, the concatena-
tion will never be fulfilled. This possibility of an 
endless concatenation proves that the signifiers are in 
lack of a transcendental, extra-lingual presence that 
would be able to stop the movement and to round off the 
signifying process. The gap between reality and lan-
guage can never be bridged. The mediation language has 
brought about (opens up) an emptiness. The subject 
wants to fill up this emptiness with words, but as ev-
ery word is itself an effect of this emptiness and car-
ries at its centre the very gap between signifier and 
siqnified, it can only increase the emptiness it tries 
to overcome. As such the completion of S by S' remains 
incomplete—other signifiers are needed to fill up the 
emptiness. The metonymy shows that at least one signi-
fier is always short and that every attempt to signify 
is limited and in need of completion. 
Moreover, metonymy is not only a characteristic of 
language in its full possibilities, but actual speech 
itself adds to this metonymic pattern. In speech one 
can never actualize all the possible signifiers 
(S....S'), one must always leave something out. In ac-
tualizing S, one drops S', although S is in need of S'. 
Of course, the virtual connection of S' to S still 
holds, but the elision of S' can do nothing but maxi-
mize the emptiness it is supposed to surmount. 
Precisely because there is an unconquerable distance 
between language and reality, the bar between signifier 
and signified is maintained. This is the meaning of 
'S(-)s' in the formula given above. 
Whereas metonymy emphasizes the incessant sliding 
of signifiers and the delaying of a fixed signified, 
metaphor is the structure that allows the emergence of 
signification. The Lacanian formulation of the 
metaphorizing process runs as follows ' f (••£)S^S( +)s', 
"indiquant que c'est dans la substitution du signifiant 
au signifiant que se produit un effet de significa-
tion."' Originally, the signifier S is a latent signi-
fier with respect to S'. S i s one of the innumerable 
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signifiers S' refers to or is connected with. Indeed, 
every signifier has a whole set of other signifiers at-
tached to itself vertically (on the paradigmatic 
axis). 7 If S is actualised and brought up above the 
bar, S' gets a new signification—the '( + )' in the 
formula. This substitution of S for S' is only possi-
ble because S' does not have a fixed or proper meaning. 
The substituting process that takes place between the 
two signifiers can in no way be reduced to or grounded 
in the availability of a prior given meaning. 
In the metaphor a signifier is substituted for 
another. S takes the place of S'. Originally, S was 
only a possible signified of S'; now, it becomes the 
actual signifier instead of S'. The positive dif-
ference between S and S' founds a new signification, in 
the formula '( + ) B '. The metaphor realizes the crossing 
of the bar between signifiers and signified (that is 
also from the order of the signifier) and so forms a 
momentary stop in the incessant sliding of signifiers. 
It is this crossing of the bar and fixing of signifiers 
in the signifying chain that allows for a creation of 
meaning. The signifying movement gets a rest and the 
emptiness the horizontal expansion tried to overmaster 
in vain gets a preliminary identification. 
According to Lacan's disciples, Jean Laplanche and 
Serge Leclaire, this moment of metaphorizing fixation 
can be linked to Lacan's notion of the anchoring 
point:• 
" . . . the 'pinning down' I speak of, or the 
point de capiton, is mythical, for no one has 
ever been able to pin a signification on a signi-
fier; but on the other hand what can be done is 
to pin one signifier to another signifier and see 
what happens. But in this case something new is 
invariably produced . . . in other words, the 
surging forth of a new signification . . . "' 
Perhaps the identifying power of the metaphor 
becomes clearer in Lacan's formula of the paternal 
metaphor: 'Si-fr—» S(|-) ' . 1 0 S is implanted in the sig-
nifying chain; the S' that S is substituted for falls 
to the level of the signified. S almost looks like an 
intruder in the signifying chain, since one does not 
know where it comes from. But it is precisely this un-
predictable newness that explains both the "superfluite 
radicale de toute signification"11 and Lacan's saying 
that there is no predestination for this "fonction de 
phore". 1 1 Due to the difference between S and S', the 
unknown signified of S' which is 'x', is offered a new 
meaning. But on the other hand, every implantation of 
a signifier S, every attempt to identify x is pre-
liminary. The identifying process can go on for ever 
(on the place kept open by 1) such that every new sig-
nifier will only give a partial meaning to x. 
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More specifically, what happens in the oedipal tri-
angle is that the child who enters the game as a dead 
subject (x) receives a name and an identity. What is 
signified to him is that the desire of the mother <S') 
has as its real signifier the Name-of-the-father (S) as 
bearer of the phallus.11 As a consequence of the ac-
ceptance of the paternal metaphor, the child renounces 
his desire to be the phallus. The law of the father 
cuts off the child from the mother, breaks off the dual 
union (castration) and thus makes the child accede to 
real desire in accordance with the order prescribed by 
the law—the child comes to know that it can have a 
phallus, like his father. This identification is not a 
congruency, like the imaginary identification in the 
mirror-stage, since there remains a difference between 
child and father, in the formula 'S (4-)'- I n order to 
become himself, the child will need other signifiers. 
Lacan underlines this unending process by equating 
the subject to the mathematical zero. "Insofar as the 
primary signifier is pure non-sense, it becomes the 
bearer of the infinitization of the value of the sub-
ject, not open to all meanings, but abolishing them 
all, which is different."1* If the phallus as the pri-
mary repressed signifier comes to zero, the consequent 
in the implication of the paternal metaphor 'S(-y-)' 
becomes ' S(£-)' or 'Soo The subject needs an infin-
ite amount of signifiers in order to give meaning to 
himself. Each signifier that will be offered to sig-
nify the repressed primal signifier, as the signifier 
of the subject's desire, will turn out to be insuffi-
cient and only provisional. After a while, it will be 
rejected. Every identification it will make possible 
will be undone in the inetonymic desire for new 
signifiers. 
The metaphor as fixation of the signifying chain 
identifies the emptiness, that, ultimately, is nothing 
but the subject itself as the open place between lan-
guage and reality, as the gap in language, as the hole 
in the universal discourse. As identification of the 
subject as zero, the metaphor gives meaning to the re-
pressed primal signifier—the phallus. It is to the 
phallus as primary signifier and its rhetorical games 
that the subject must subject himself. That is why the 
metaphor, insofar as it succeeds in identifying the 
phallus and in creating signification, is a symptom. 
"C'est dire que la realite la plus serieuse, et 
meme par l'homme la seule serieuse, si l'on 
considere son röle ä soutenir la metonymie de son 
desir, ne peut etre retenue que dans la 
metaphore.ni* 
Indeed, whereas the function of the metaphor is to 
give new meaning to the phallus ab signifier of desire, 
metonymy serves as that structure that annihilates ev-
ery definition and feeds the insatiability of desire. 
70 
Metonymy as the endless chain of signifiers, always on 
the move, is desire itself. That is the other thing 
the child gets to know in the oedipal triangle, i.e., 
being cut off from his mother, the dual union is 
forever delayed. The Name-of-the-father as law and 
symbolic order confronts the child with its own lack. 
In identifying with the father the child accedes to 
language but also establishes the unsurmountable 
difference. In language desire becomes a real desire, 
something that will never be fulfilled. The desired 
object can only be approached through a metonymical 
chain. "Ainsi le symbole se manifeste d'abord comme 
meurtre de la chose, et cette mort constitue dans le 
sujet 1'eternisation de son desir."1' 
Through the castration the child ceases to be a 
zero and is offered the opportunity to become some-one. 
At first, the child desired to be one with the mother; 
this undifferentiated identity is, however, 
meaningless. It is nothing. The child can only get an 
identity if it knows itself as different from the 
mother—difference is the necessary condition for 
identity. But once this difference is brought about, 
the oneness with the mother can never be accomplished. 
The oneness with the mother is broken up, and the self-
identity becomes visible as a difference from others. 
In this sense, the phallus is both the "signifier par 
excellence of the impossible identity [with the 
mother)" 1 7 and the signifier of the impossibility of 
the total personality. Language not only enternalizes 
the subject's desire for union with the mother, it also 
defers (differs) the subject's own identity in submit-
ting him to the endless play of metonymy and metaphor. 
This is the play language has written. The subject 
enters it as actor in the oedipal mise-en-scene. In 
obeying the law of the father, the subject ceases to be 
the phallus and accepts the possibility of having a 
phallus. As such, he becomes a "want-to-be", "un man-
que a etre." As long as one is the phallus, one is 
zero, one cannot become a subject. As soon as one has 
the phallus, one lacks and is in desire—one is under-
way to being (a subject). This is the meaning of 
another Lacanian oracle about the phallus as "le seul 
objet dont 1'avoir necessite le manque ä l'etre."1* 
This seems to be the outcome of the formula Lacan 
gave of the oedipal complex ' -J? . — * s ( j ) ' . He calls 
it the formula of the paternal metaphor. The foregoing 
seems to suggest that metaphor and metonymy belong 
together: metaphor as identification and fixation, 
metonymy as eternalisation and endless sliding. Could 
one therefore not say that the oedipal complex is the 
installation of both metaphor and metonymy? 
Indeed, for the paternal metaphor to succeed, the 
child first has to be displaced. This displacement is 
the breaking up of the dual union and, as metonymical 
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move, triggers off the eternal desire for the irrecup-
erably lost object. But the father not only castrates, 
he also offers the child a possible identification. In 
this way, metonymy and metaphor can perhaps be con-
nected with the two functions of the father's 
presence—castration and promise.1' 
The same opposition can be found in Jacques 
Derrida's article "Le retrait de la metaphore." For 
him every metaphysics is a metaphor in that it tries to 
give a name to the unnameable par excellence. Being 
(das Sein). As such, all metaphysical names for Being 
are metaphors: EIDOS. substantia, monad, ground, will. 
Being always retreats, it withdraws—there is no full 
unconcealment in metaphysics. Every metaphysical name 
leaves much unsaid and unthought. "On serait alors 
tente de dire: le(sic) metaphysique, qui correspond 
en son discours au retrait de l'etre, tend ä rassem-
bler, dans la reosemblance, tous ses ecarts 
metonymiques dans une grande metaphore de l'etre ou 
de la pensee de l'etre. Ce rassemblement est la lan-
que de la metaphysique."2* 
Such is the game Being or LOGOS plays: a Saussu-
rian chessgame or a Heraclitian game of draughts. In 
this game man is needed for the "lente mutation de 
l'etre dans 1' EN PANTA du langage."21 Asking why 
there is a play or what is being played for, one should 
(and is afraid to) remember the words of Novalis: 
"Gerade das Eigentümliche der Sprache, dass sie sich 
bloss um sich selbst bekümmert, weisz keiner."22 
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